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Abstract Companies that are serious about corporate
governance and business ethics are turning their atten-
tion to gender diversity at the most senior levels of
business (Institute of Business Ethics, Business Ethics
Briefing 21:1, 2011). Board gender diversity has been
the subject of several studies carried out by international
organizations such as Catalyst (Increasing gender
diversity on boards: Current index of formal approaches,
2012), the World Economic Forum (Hausmann et al.,
The global gender gap report, 2010), and the European
Board Diversity Analysis (Is it getting easier to find
women on European boards? 2010). They all lead to
reports confirming the overall relatively low proportion
of women on boards and the slow pace at which more
women are being appointed. Furthermore, the proportion
of women on corporate boards varies much across
countries. Based on institutional theory, this study
hypothesizes and tests whether this variation can be
attributed to differences in cultural settings across
countries. Our analysis of the representation of women
on boards for 32 countries during 2010 reveals that two
cultural characteristics are indeed associated with the
observed differences. We use the cultural dimensions
proposed by Hofstede (Culture’s consequences: Inter-
national differences in work-related values, 1980) to
measure this construct. Results show that countries
which have the greatest tolerance for inequalities in the
distribution of power and those that tend to value the
role of men generally exhibit lower representations of
women on boards.
Keywords Culture ! Board of directors ! Gender ! Gender
diversity ! Diversity ! Cross-country ! Corporate
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Introduction
Board gender diversity is an important ethical issue for
companies (Institute of Business Ethics 2011, p. 1) and is
promoted in several countries’ laws and national gover-
nance codes. There have been numerous national and
international studies examining the factors influencing the
composition of corporate boards of directors (e.g., Dalton
et al. 1998) and the presence of women directors on boards
(e.g., Terjesen et al. 2009). One strand of this research
examines the presumed relationship between national cul-
ture and board structure (Hickson and Pugh 1995; House
et al. 1999; Li and Harrison 2008; Semenov 2000). These
studies focus on the level of independence of the directors.
We wish to extend this line of research by focusing on
whether cultural characteristics drive the appointment of
women to corporate boards across countries.
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Catalyst (2011)1 published the following statistics on the
proportion of women on boards by country: Sweden
(27.3 %); Finland (24.5 %); Denmark (13.9 %); United
Kingdom (15 %); Belgium (7.7 %); Spain (9.3 %), and
Italy (3.7 %). Concerned about this under-representation of
women and the slow rate of progress in this regard, several
European Union countries are trying to bridge the gap
between genders in corporate governance by imposing
objectives or quotas for listed companies. For instance, in
2003 Norway adopted a law requiring that 40 % of all
publicly listed company board members be women by
2008, which explains why Norway has the highest rate of
representation at 44.2 % (Catalyst 2008). Spain, France,
and Belgium have passed similar laws, with compliance
deadlines in 2015 (Spain equality law 2007), 2017, and
2018 (Catalyst 2011), respectively. Germany and Sweden
have adopted a comply or explain approach (Catalyst
2011). In Britain, the Financial Reporting Council (2011) is
considering amending the UK Corporate Governance Code
to require listed companies to establish a policy concerning
boardroom diversity, including measurable implementation
objectives, and to annually disclose a summary of the
measures adopted and of the progress made in achieving
the objectives (Davies 2011). Eventually, adoption of such
rules or guidelines may considerably reduce the differences
between countries. However, in the meantime, the cross-
country differences remain significant.
In light of the above statistics and reactions from gov-
ernments, our research question is: Why does the level of
female representation on corporate boards of directors differ
so much from one country to another? More specifically, we
wish to examine whether and to what extent the culture of a
country may affect the level of female representation.
Despite an extensive literature on the reasons why women
should have better access to corporate boards and constitute a
criticalmass (Labelle et al. 2010; Haslamet al. 2010,Konrad
et al. 2008; Kramer et al. 2006; Carter et al. 2003; Burgess
and Tharenou 2002) and despite important differences in
women’s representation on boards of directors across
countries, prior studies have not investigated the possible
influence of national cultural dimensions onwomen’s access
to boards. Based on 6 case studies conducted in the contexts
of four European countries (UK, Norway, Spain and the
Netherlands), Sealy and Doldor (2009b) conclude that it is
vital to consider the cultural and political context when
examining board diversity.
Culture is defined as the set of values, beliefs, principles,
and attitudes that are widely shared within a group of
people (Hofstede 1980). Shared culture conditions indi-
vidual behavior in the various spheres of everyday life and
may thus help better understand these behaviors. It is on
this basis that we use institutional theory to examine
whether culture differently conditions the social roles
assigned to men and women and even encourages gender
stereotypes, which may influence firm’s decisions to elect
women to boards of directors.
Following the seminal work of Hofstede (1980), several
studies have examined how corporate decision-making
may be influenced by cultural dimensions (Gray, 1988;
Salter and Niswander 1995; Ralston et al. 1993; Pedersen
and Thomsen 1997; Semenov 2000; Stulz and Williamson
2003; Hope 2003; House et al. 2004; Guiso et al. 2006).
We wish to contribute to this line of research by examining
whether national cultural dimensions are associated with
firms’ decisions to appoint female directors.
We analyze the rate of representation of women on
boards of directors of 7,302 publicly traded companies in
32 countries. Along with our variable of interest pertaining
to the cultural dimensions of a country, we control for other
factors likely to affect female board representation, such as
board size, whether the Chair of the board is a woman, firm
size, profitability and industrial sector, and the country’s
code of corporate governance. Our results show that two
cultural characteristics, as measured by the Hofstede
(1980) dimensions, are associated with variations observed
in the level of female representation on corporate boards.
Our article is structured as follows. Cultural factors and
the theoretical framework on which we base our study are
set forth in ‘‘Theoretical Framework Linking Culture and
Board Gender Diversity’’ section. We develop our
hypotheses in ‘‘Hypotheses’’ section. ‘‘Methodology’’
section describes the methodology. The results of our
descriptive, univariate, and multivariate analyses are pre-
sented and interpreted in ‘‘Results and Analyses’’ section,
followed by a robustness analysis. Finally, ‘‘Conclusions’’
section presents a discussion of the results and conclusions.
Theoretical Framework Linking Culture and Board
Gender Diversity
There is no agreement within social sciences on a definition
of the concept of culture. In general, culture refers to a set
1 Several other prominent organizations confirm the imbalance of
women on boards worldwide and the wide variation between
countries. The Corporate Gender Gap Report of 2010, published by
the World Economic Forum, presents the results of a survey of more
than 3,400 companies including the 100 largest employers in each of
the 30 member countries of the Organization for Economic Co-
operation and Development (OECD), together with Brazil, Russia,
and China. The 2010 European Board Diversity Analysis, prepared by
Egon Zehnder International, analyzes data on 340 of the largest
companies (market capitalization of more than EUR 4 billion) across
17 European countries. The report of Lord Davies of Abersosch,
published on February 24, 2011 and commissioned by the United
Kingdom government, examines the current situation of the FSTE
350 boards and gives its conclusion after wide consultation with
various interested parties.
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of parameters that significantly differentiates one group
from another. For Hofstede (1980), culture is considered as
the collective social program that determines the set of
values, beliefs, principles, and attitudes shared by members
of a specific social community. House et al. (2004) suggest
that culture serves as the reference frame that makes pos-
sible the interpretation and meaning of significant common
events experienced by the members of a community; such
experiences are very important and passed down through
the generations. The fundamental characteristic of culture
is that it is a social design that conditions the majority of
social practices and processes. Therefore, a great deal of
social behavior can be understood through the prevailing
culture or social norms. With regard to the object of this
study, the gender perspective in one country can be
affected by culture, i.e., the mental structure through which
individuals think about their social world, generating
gender stereotypes or roles associated with women that
could influence the presence of women on boards (Nelson
and Levesque 2007).
The notion of gender is in itself a cultural construct
created to refer to differences between men and women in
society in terms of attitude, mental structures, and expec-
tations. Gender as a notion goes beyond biological differ-
ences. Social beliefs about the roles of men and women
surface in notions such as gender equality or discrimina-
tion. Some societies seem to ignore these differences when
assigning roles; others seem to maximize them (House
et al. 1999).
Several studies examine the different roles assigned to
men and women in society on the basis of variables such as
economic development (Moore and Shackman 1996; Nuss
and Majka 1983), or political systems (Clark and Carvalho
1996; Paxton 1997). Results show that a difference in
economic development does not create new roles for
women. However, there are indications that political sys-
tems fulfill an important function when determining
women’s role in society and, above all, their access to
positions of responsibility traditionally reserved for men.
Pioneering studies, like Friedland and Alford (1990),
Hofstede (1991), and Hickson and Pugh (1995), conclude
that the cultural and social characteristics of a country have
a great influence on the structure of corporate management.
Aguilera and Jackson (2003) and Lubatkin et al. (2005,
2007) examine the influence of the institutional context on
corporate control mechanisms. These authors recognize the
importance of institutional differences, such as legal and
cultural factors, in conditioning corporate practices.
Institutional theory assumes that organizations are sub-
ject to the institutional environment, which includes the
culture in which they operate, and that corporate models
are based on the institutional norms present in a specific
society (Meyer and Rowan 1977). Such norms can be
simply assumed, endorsed by public opinion, or enforced
by law (Starbuck 1976). Therefore, these norms inevitably
involve normative obligations, but also the shared values
and beliefs that contribute to the culture of a society.
In order to survive in competitive environments and
acquire legitimacy, organizations must design their orga-
nizational structure in line with the set of rules and belief
systems that prevail in the country in which they operate.
The legal foundation on which every society is based,
involves a set of regulatory obligations, as well as values
and beliefs that are shared by all members of a society and
determine their expected social behavior (DiMaggio and
Powell 1983; Scott 1987). Thus, conformity to social
expectations is considered key to the survival of a com-
pany. Companies are therefore social entities embedded in
an institutional order set. They tend to shape their organi-
zational structures to fit the established social order and
gain legitimacy. Since culture, as a set of beliefs and val-
ues, is one of the institutional forces of any society, the way
in which organizational structure are set up may be
strongly influenced by cultural values that prevail in a
society. Indeed, authors such as Aguilera and Jackson
(2003) or Lubatkin et al. (2007) indicate how differences in
the institutional environment are the basis for divergences
in corporate governance structures.
Li and Harrison (2008) also use institutional theory to
develop hypotheses related to the composition and struc-
ture of multinational company boards by using the Hofst-
ede framework and data; their definition of board
composition is limited to the percentage of outside, or non-
management, directors. The results of their study show that
culture exerts a significant influence on the structure of
boards of directors. Institutional theory has also been used
to explore the presence of women on corporate boards in
relation to other parameters, such as their representation at
other levels of the companies (Bilimoria 2006), their par-
ticipation as political representatives (Terjesen and Singh
2008), or gender stereotypes and/or discrimination in the
labor market (Nelson and Levesque 2007). Given this
background, we consider that institutional theory provides
a suitable framework to examine which dimensions of the
cultural environment are related to the observed between
country variations in female representation on boards.
In summary, several reasons justify the use of the cul-
tural dimensions of a country as an explanatory factor.
First, comparative studies show that not only is the pro-
portion of women on boards generally low, except in
Norway where a quota was adopted, but also this propor-
tion varies between countries. Second, research shows that
institutional theory provides a good framework to study the
presumed relationship between national cultures and the
structure of corporate boards. Thus, the objective of this
paper is to relate both lines of research to analyze to what
Appointing Women to Boards: Is There a Cultural Bias? 431
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extent the culture of a country may explain cross-country
variations in terms of board gender diversity.
Several authors have proposed various cultural dimen-
sions or values to describe cultural differences between
countries. Hofstede (1980) proposes four cultural dimen-
sions. This author was followed by others whose goal was
to improve and extend his work. Work on cultural values
by Schwartz (1992), Ingleharts (1977, 2001), Trompenaars
(1993), and on the cultural framework proposed in the
Global Leadership Organizational Behavior Effectiveness
(GLOBE) program (House et al. 2004) have nourished the
evolution of the concept. As pointed out by Robbins
(2004), over the years the Hofstede cultural dimensions
have become the basic theoretical framework to differen-
tiate national cultures. Thus, to examine the relationship
between culture, our variable of interest, and board gender
diversity, we use the four cultural dimensions identified by
Hofstede (1980).
Hypotheses
Hofstede’s cultural model posits that there are cultural
differences between countries. This would explain why
different countries respond in different ways to the same
social phenomenon. These national cultural dimensions
were empirically derived through a questionnaire admin-
istered to IBM employees from 40 countries in two time
periods, namely 1967–1968 and 1971–1973. The aggre-
gation of individual responses by country allowed Hofstede
to identify four cultural dimensions that are determinants of
a country’s culture namely power distance, individualism–
collectivism, masculinity and uncertainty avoidance
Power distance refers to the degree to which a society
accepts an unequal distribution of power in its institutions
and organizations. A high value for this variable indicates
that inequalities in power and wealth are more widely
accepted. It is a well known fact that women participate
less than men in the power structure of organizations such
as the board of directors. We therefore expect that coun-
tries that manifest a high power distance value, as mea-
sured by Hofstede (2000), are more tolerant to the ‘‘old
boys’ club’’ syndrome and thus to a lower level of female
representation on corporate boards. Sealy and Doldor
(2009a, b) account for the lack of diversity on boards in
part because women are assumed to lack the social capital
(or power) to get onto boards. Progression to board-level
positions relies on access to the organization’s informal
networks (old boys’ club) in order to keep informed about
opportunities beyond the formal channels and to gain
support from powerful allies or mentors (mainly men).
According to Sealy et al., developing sufficient social
capital is crucial to being accepted as a potential board
director. We expect the difficulty to be compounded in
countries or institutional settings exhibiting high power
distance. This leads to our first hypothesis:
H1 The proportion of women on corporate boards is
likely to be lower in countries exhibiting high power
distance.
The variable individualismmeasures the degree to which
individuals prefer to behave according to individual values
rather than to those of the group to which they belong. This
variable gages the degree to which a society appreciates
individual characteristics such as autonomy, privacy, and the
ability to set personal goals, as opposed to being loyal to a
group, committing to its norms, and favoring social cohe-
sion. A high value for this variable indicates a more indi-
vidualistic society. In collective or non-individualistic
societies there is often more sensitivity toward the repre-
sentation of minorities in decision-making positions, so that
the voice of a greater range of social groups is represented
(Very et al. 1997; Schuler and Rogovsky 1998). These
societies would tend to foster more female representation on
corporate boards. On this basis, it is argued that high indi-
vidualism values may be negatively related to the level of
female representation on corporate boards. However, it may
also be argued that traditional collective values could
emphasize traditional gender-specific roles (as in masculin-
ity) in which the boardroom is considered a male domain.
Similarly, a high value on this dimension could reflect a
commitment to individual human rights, which could
include gender equality based on personal merit. Finally, it
may be possible that ‘‘individualism’’manifests in a desire to
pursue one’s preferences regardless of stereotypes, conven-
tions, etc. That is, women in a country characterized by a
relatively high degree of individualismmay bemore likely to
seek to positions—such as board directorships—that they
were conventionally denied? We therefore formulate a null
hypothesis between PWOB and individualism:
H2 The proportion of women on corporate boards is not
related to the individualism dimension of a country.
For Hofstede (2000), in a ‘‘masculine’’ society, social
gender roles are clearly distinct. Men are expected to be
assertive, tough, and focused on material success. Values
such as performance, assertiveness, success and competi-
tiveness prevail. On the other hand, women are expected to
be modest, close to their emotions, and concerned with
quality of life, personal relationships, and solidarity. Low
levels of ‘‘masculinity’’ are found in societies where social
gender roles overlap. Masculinity translates what Sealy
et al. (2009a) refers to as persistent gender stereotypes—
generalizations we make about men and women as groups
or the characteristics we mentally associate with each
gender group. This stereotype engenders a constant gender
432 A. Carrasco et al.
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bias in the appraisal of skill and merit in favor of men.
Masculine societies define gender roles in a traditional and
stereotyped way. In this regard, Konrad et al. (2000), Sealy
et al. (2009a), and Oakley (2000) show empirical evidence
that the attribution of stereotyped values to women can
negatively bias their appointment to corporate boards. We
therefore expect a negative association between the level of
masculinity of a country and its level of female represen-
tation on corporate boards. The third hypothesis is:
H3 The proportion of women on corporate boards is
likely to be lower in countries exhibiting high masculinity.
Uncertainty avoidance reflects that the citizens of a country
prefer structured over non-structured situations. A high value
of uncertainty avoidance indicates a low tolerance for uncer-
tainty and ambiguity, favoring a society oriented toward rules,
laws, and controls to reduce the level of uncertainty. Con-
versely, a low value indicates less concern toward uncertainty
and ambiguity, a lesser need for regulations, and more open-
ness to change. Countries with low uncertainty avoidance are
more tolerant of diversity in opinions and alternative behaviors
and are open to more and larger risks. In this sense, as noted in
the literature (Schwartz 1986; Burke 1997; Zelechoski and
Bilimoria 2004), women have different experiences than men
in the workplace, market, public and community services, so
that women bring a different perspective to the debate and
decision-making (Billing andAlvesson 1989). As a result, one
expects that firms operating in countrieswith a high capacity to
confront change and adapt to new realities, as would be the
case with allowing a larger number of women in the power
structure of organizations,would show ahigher level of female
representation on corporate boards. Consequently, the expec-
ted relation between the uncertainty avoidance variable and
the proportion of women on boards is negative as predicted in
the last hypothesis:
H4 The representation of women on corporate boards is
likely to be lower in countries exhibiting high uncertainty
avoidance.
Methodology
In this section, we present the sample, the model and the
variables.
Sample
The sample for this study is from the BoardEx2 database
which profiles the corporate boards and individual directors
of public firms across the world. Our initial sample consists
of 8,033 firms for which we were able to collect individual
board of directors’ characteristics such as gender. We do
not apply any other filters. Firms for which we could not
get information about the variables relevant to the study
were eliminated. This elimination process resulted in a
sample comprising 7,302 boards from 32 countries which
are presented in Table 2.
Model and Variables
We use an OLS regression model to test whether cross-
cultural differences between countries have an impact on
the proportion of female directors on corporate boards,
while controlling for other factors known to affect board
composition. The model is as follows:
Proportion of Women on corporate boards
¼ f country’s culture; control variablesð Þ
In the above model, the dependent variable which is the
proportion of women on corporate boards (PWOB) is
measured as the number of female directors divided by the
total number of board members. We use the Hofstede 2000
cultural dimensions discussed in the previous section to
measure the main culture of the countries where the sam-
pled firms operate. These dimensions are: power distance,
individualism, masculinity, and uncertainty avoidance.
Each variable can take a value of 1–100. Table 7 in
Appendix shows the mean values of these cultural
dimensions per country in our sample as per Hofstede
2000. To control for factors other than the cultural
dimensions that have been found to affect the proportion of
women on corporate boards, we introduce other variables
into the model. The choice of control variables is mainly
driven by their explanatory power in a variety of prior
studies on women’s access to boards of directors.
First, we control for the total number of directors on the
board, Board size, as it was found to affect the level of
representation by women on such boards (Carter et al.
2003; Coffey and Wang 1998; Erhardt et al. 2003; Hillman
and Cannella 2007). Second, we control for situations
where a woman is Chair of the board. Considering insti-
tutional theory (Bilimoria 2006; Strydom and Au Yong
2012; Palvia et al. 2012), this situation could influence the
number of women appointed on the board. The variable
2 BoardEx is a business intelligence service providing data concern-
ing the board of directors and senior management of public and large
Footnote 2 continued
private companies. It is mainly used by institutional investors, wealth
managers, and consultants but more and more as a source for aca-
demic research. The BoardEx database holds in-depth profiles of over
500,000 of the world’s business leaders. BoardEx was established
originally in 2001 by Management Diagnostics Ltd in the UK and has
since grown to North America and Asia.
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chairwoman is a dichotomous variable with a value of 1
when the Chair of the board is female and 0 otherwise.
Third, we consider the possible effect that firm size might
have on PWOB. Some studies have found that in small
companies women have a greater chance of being pro-
moted in the company’s organizational structure (Andre
1995; Bertrand and Hallock 2001). This is largely due to
the fact that in smaller companies it is easier to detect the
potential of female candidates to serve as board directors.
On the contrary, other studies find a positive relationship
between the size of a firm and the presence of women on
the board of directors (Catalyst 2001; Harrigan 1981;
Heidrick and Struggles 1977). This might be explained by
the fact that large companies are more likely to use formal
evaluation and promotion processes to facilitate women’s
entry into high-level positions corresponding to their level
of education and training. Thus, we do not predict the sign
of the relationship between Firm size and the PWOB
dependant variable. To proxy for firm size, several authors
have used the corporate sales figures (Coffey and Wang
1998; Hambrick and Cannella 2004; Hillman and Cannella
2007; McCormick Hyland and Marcellino 2002; Sander
and Boivie 2004), total assets (Carter et al. 2003; Erhardt
et al. 2003; Peng 2004), or the total number of employees
(Coffey and Wang 1998; Konrad and Mangel 2000; Smith
2007). We use the logarithm of sales to measure Firm size
in order to avoid problems of scale in the distribution of
this variable.
Fourth, our model controls for firm performance, labeled
profitability, as prior studies conclude that pluralism
including gender diversity on boards entails a variety of
points of view that leads to better decision-making and
performance (Ben Amar et al. 2013), and that financially
successful firms may select more women directors (Carter
et al. 2010). Profitability is computed as net profit divided
by total equity as in other international studies (Adler 2001;
Catalyst 2004; Carter et al. 2003).
Fifth, we control for the legislation or regulation adop-
ted in various countries to increase female representation
on corporate boards. The main tool used to promote gender
equality policies is the national code of good governance.
The dichotomous variable, code, takes the value 1 when the
code of good governance of a country specifically refers to
the promotion of more women on boards and 0 when such
reference is not made. We use the code in force as of 2010
as some countries have amended their codes of good
governance several times.
Finally, as Brewer (2001) and McDonald (2000) indi-
cate, the type of business a company engages in may affect
the opportunities for women to take on more responsibili-
ties. Therefore, the sampled firms are classified into 10
sectors of activity: energy, materials, industrial, consumer
discretionary, consumer staples, health care, financial,
information technology, telecommunication services, and
utilities.
Results and Analyses
In this section, we first present and discuss descriptive
statistics relative to women’s participation on boards for
our total sample. The statistics are also broken down by
country. We then present and discuss the results of our
multivariate analysis aimed at determining if there is a
cultural bias in the appointment of female directors around
the world.
Descriptive Analysis of Women’s Participation
on Corporate Boards
Table 1 presents data on the number of directors on boards,
classified according to their gender. The average number of
directors is 9.63, of which only 8 % are women. This figure
is consistent with previous research, which reveals that
women are scarcely represented in upper-level corporate
positions.
Table 2 presents descriptive statistics about board size
and gender representation by country. The proportion of
female directors is higher than the 8 % average in Sweden
(23 %), Finland (20 %), South Africa (17 %), Israel
(15 %), Denmark, France, and Luxemburg (10 %), and
Belgium and Spain (9 %). Most of these countries have
imposed or are considering imposing quotas or other con-
straints on their public firms to promote gender diversity on
boards. We specifically control for this effect of regulation
in the multivariate analyses in ‘‘Multivariate Analysis’’
section. The following countries exhibit below-average
women participation in corporate boards: Japan (2 %),
New Zealand (4 %), Austria, India, Russia, and Switzer-
land (5 %), Australia, Brazil, China, Germany, Hong
Kong, Italy, Portugal, Singapore, and the United Kingdom
(6 %), and Greece, Holland, and Ireland (7 %).
Table 3 shows the level of female presence on corporate
boards per country. As could be expected because of cur-
rent or forthcoming regulation, countries like Denmark,
Table 1 Composition of the board of directors
Variable Minimum Maximum Mean Standard
deviation
Size of the board 1 54 9.63 4.43
Men directors 1 51 8.76 3.92
Women directors 0 14 0.87 1.15
% women
directors
0 75 8 9
434 A. Carrasco et al.
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Finland, France, Israel, South Africa, and Sweden exhibit a
higher-than-average proportion of female directors. Fur-
ther, when there is at least one female director, Finland,
Sweden and Mexico have an average number of female
directors which is close to the critical mass of 3 identified
by Konrad et al. (2008). However, it is also worth noting
that Germany, Mexico, Poland, and the United States
which exhibits lower-than-average proportion of female
representation on boards have an above average percentage
of boards with at least one woman. Finally, Australia,
Japan, New Zealand, and the United Kingdom have the
highest percentage of boards with no female director. The
case of Belgium stands out with a majority of corporate
boards (54.7 %) with no female director despite an above
average proportion of female directors on boards with at
least one female director.
Table 4 presents a contingent analysis of the existence
or not of a national code of corporate governance
encouraging the participation of women in corporate
boards and other variables relative to the board. The
existence of such codes is bound to affect board gender
diversity. Seven countries in our sample have such a
national code encouraging gender diversity: Denmark,
Finland, Luxembourg, Holland, Ireland, Spain, and Swe-
den. Panel A indicates that 42.3 % of the firms (548)
operating in these countries have at least one woman on
their board. In the absence of a national code of corporate
governance or when the code does not refer to gender
diversity, the proportion of firms with at least one woman
on board increases to 52.5 % (3,154 firms). This differ-
ence is statistically significant (v2 = 43,861; p\ 0.001).
Therefore, contrary to our expectations, codes of gover-
nance do not appear to significantly influence the presence
of women on corporate boards.
Furthermore, as can be seen in Panel B of Table 4,
references to gender diversity in codes of governance do
not result in greater overall female representation on cor-
porate boards, as the percentage of women is the same in
both cases (8 %). Finally, the average size of corporate
boards, as well as the average number of women are sig-
nificantly higher when there is no reference to gender
diversity in the national code of governance.
Multivariate Analysis
Table 5 presents the results of the multivariate OLS
regression models used to investigate the hypothesized
relationship between culture, the variable of interest, and
the proportion of female directors, while controlling for
other variables that could affect this proportion. All coef-
ficients are standardized which allows to compare them.
To better see the effect of culture in the subsequent
models, model 1 only includes the control variables. The
level of women’s participation on corporate boards is sig-
nificantly higher for companies whose boards are larger,
for companies where the Chair is a woman and for com-
panies that are larger as measured by sales. This evidence
brings to light a series of important issues. First, with
reference to the size of the board, we interpret its positive
relationship with the PWOB as greater women represen-
tation being achieved by increasing the total number of
directors.
Second, female representation on corporate boards is
greater for those companies where the Chair of the board is
a woman. Finally, there is a positive relation between
firm size and PWOB. These empirical relationships are









Australia 6.50 6.08 0.41 5.64
Austria 12.61 12.03 0.58 4.59
Belgium 8.74 7.98 0.75 8.58
Brazil 10.92 10.25 0.67 6.03
Canada 9.04 8.17 0.87 8.43
China 10.53 10.00 0.53 5.50
Denmark 10.48 9.48 1.00 9.78
Finland 10.29 8.06 2.23 19.88
France 10.69 9.64 1.05 10.25
Germany 13.55 12.60 0.95 5.95
Greece 9.46 8.79 0.67 7.31
Holland 8.75 8.06 0.69 6.59
Hong Kong 12.15 11.20 0.95 6.18
India 10.39 9.83 0.56 5.29
Ireland 9.15 8.61 0.54 6.55
Israel 7.66 6.58 1.08 15.40
Italy 11.78 11.10 0.67 6.28
Japan 12.71 12.50 0.21 2.08
Luxembourg 8.42 7.58 0.83 10.17
Malaysia 8.17 7.52 0.65 7.73
Mexico 17.12 15.76 1.35 7.87
New Zealand 7.22 6.89 0.33 4.21
Poland 12.54 11.46 1.08 8.30
Portugal 10.55 9.95 0.59 5.68
Russia 13.33 12.61 0.72 4.73
Singapore 10.20 9.60 0.60 6.09
South Africa 11.00 9.20 1.80 16.73
Spain 12.03 10.87 1.16 9.16
Sweden 9.97 7.70 2.27 23.25
Switzerland 9.30 8.70 0.59 5.11
United Kingdom 6.73 6.28 0.46 6.19
United States 10.17 9.22 0.95 8.04
Mean 10.38 9.51 0.87 8.24
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maintained in all estimated models and can therefore be
considered robust. On the other hand, profitability and
corporate governance codes do not appear to be related to
gender diversity.
Models 2, 3, 4, and 5 introduce variables to reflect the
various cultural dimensions characterizing the countries
in which our sample firms operate. To measure these
variables, we use the values that Hofstede (2000) assigns
to different cultural dimensions. Model 6 integrates
all cultural dimensions. Our hypotheses are confirmed
for two of the three cultural dimensions for which
we propose directional hypotheses: power distance and
masculinity.
The sign of the coefficient for power distance is negative
and significant in model 2 and model 6. As defined, the
cultural dimension of power distance measures the extent
to which the less powerful members of society expect and
accept that power is distributed unequally. Hence, our
results support Hypothesis 1, namely that the proportion of
women on corporate boards is likely to be lower in coun-
tries where power distance is greater. In countries with high
power distance, inequality between men and women is
tolerated, therefore underrepresentations of women on
boards is not considered a problem. This in turn fosters a
considerable cultural barrier for women in the selection
process of new directors.
Table 3 Female presence on
corporate boards per country














Number % Number % Number Number %
Australia 189 67 93 33 117 1.26 5.6
Austria 18 58.1 13 41.9 18 1.38 4.6
Belgium 29 54.7 24 45.3 40 1.67 8.6
Brazil 7 58.3 5 41.7 8 1.6 6.0
Canada 164 51.6 154 48.4 277 1.8 8.4
China 9 60 6 40 8 1.33 5.5
Denmark 5 23.8 16 76.2 21 1.31 9.8
Finland 4 12.9 27 87.1 69 2.56 19.9
France 81 35.2 149 64.8 241 1.62 10.3
Germany 77 48.7 81 51.3 150 1.85 6.0
Greece 14 58.3 10 41.7 16 1.6 7.3
Hong Kong 11 55 9 45 19 2.11 6.2
India 99 57.9 72 42.1 95 1.32 5.3
Ireland 22 53.7 19 46.3 22 1.16 6.6
Israel 8 8.2 99 91.8 105 1.18 15.4
Italy 34 50.7 33 49.3 45 1.36 6.3
Japan 29 85.3 5 14.7 7 1.4 2.1
Luxembourg 6 50 6 50 10 1.67 10.2
Malaysia 13 56.5 10 43.5 15 1.5 7.7
Mexico 8 47.1 9 52.9 23 2.56 7.9
Holland 37 56.9 28 43.1 45 1.61 6.6
New Zealand 6 66.7 3 33.3 3 1 4.2
Poland 2 15.4 11 84.6 14 1.27 8.3
Portugal 13 59.1 9 40.9 13 1.44 5.7
Russia 10 55.6 8 44.4 13 1.63 4.7
Singapore 11 55 9 45 12 1.33 6.1
South Africa 8 11.3 63 88.7 128 2.03 16.7
Spain 20 32.3 42 38.7 72 1.71 9.2
Sweden 4 4.3 89 95.7 211 2.37 23.3
Switzerland 37 57.8 27 42.2 38 1.41 5.1
United Kingdom 648 66.9 321 33.1 441 1.37 6.2
United States 1977 46.6 2262 53.4 4033 1.78 8.2
Mean 113 47.5 116 51.6 198 1.6 8.2
436 A. Carrasco et al.
123
Author's personal copy
To test hypothesis 2, the variable individualism is
introduced in models 3 and 6. As hypothesized, PWOB
does not appear to be affected by the individualism (col-
lectivism) cultural dimension.
The masculinity dimension is introduced in models 4
and 6. The coefficient of masculinity is statistically and
negatively related to PWOB which is in conformity with
our third hypothesis stating that the PWOB is likely to be
lower in countries where the masculinity dimension is
greater. This dimension refers to the role division between
genders. According to Hofstede (1980), in ‘‘masculine’’
societies, gender roles are more clearly differentiated,
while in feminine societies there is more ambiguity
regarding gender roles. Assuming that candidate women
are as qualified and experienced as their male counterparts,
in masculine societies, the assessment of skill and merit is
biased. This bias is caused by persistent gender stereo-
types—generalizations we make about men and women as
groups. Hence similar behaviors are perceived and valued
differently depending on whether they are displayed by
men or women, and therefore the accumulation of these
stereotype effects can create barriers for women to join
boards.
The standardized coefficients for masculinity are larger
than those of power distance which indicates that mascu-
linity has a greater impact on PWOB. Furthermore, the
absolute value of the impact of these variables on PWOB is
not negligible. For instance, a 30 unit decrease in mascu-
linity is associated with an increase of 4.41 % of the
PWOB value. The coefficient of masculinity is greater than












3,154 (52.5 %) 548 (42.3 %) 3,702
Total 6,008 1,294 7,302












Table 5 OLS analysis of the
factors presumed to affect the
proportion of women on
corporate boards using
Hofstede’s cultural dimensions
p values in parentheses:
*** p\ 0.01
Variable Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6
Board size 0.173 0.161 0.169 0.182 0.173 0.167
(0.00)*** (0.00)*** (0.00)*** (0.00)*** (0.00)*** (0.00)***
Chairwoman 0.237 0.239 0.238 0.236 0.237 0.238
(0.00)*** (0.00)*** (0.00)*** (0.00)*** (0.00)*** (0.00)***
Firm size 0.079 0.110 0.091 0.051 0.080 0.089
(0.00)*** (0.00)*** (0.00)*** (0.00)*** (0.00)*** (0.00)***
Profitability 0.002 0.004 0.002 0.003 0.002 0.006
(0.88) (0.74) (0.85) (0.71) (0.88) (0.58)
Code 0.006 0.003 0.005 0.002 0.004 0.004
(0.44) (0.65) (0.46) (0.72) (0.57) (0.77)
Power distance – -0.082 – – – -0.096
(0.00)*** (0.00)***
Individualism – – 0.004 – – 0.010
(0.32) (0.32)
Masculinity – – – -0.129 -0.147
(0.00)*** (0.00)***
Uncertainty – – – -0.006 -0.010
(0.73) (0.45)
Sector control YES YES YES YES YES YES
Adjusted R2 0.106 0.111 0.105 0.121 0.105 0.140
F-Test 171.609 151.760 144.000 167.972 143.010 122.490
p value (0.00)*** (0.00)*** (0.00)*** (0.00)*** (0.00)*** (0.00)***
Mean VIF 1.27 1.30 1.31 1.25 1.27 1.49
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firm size and just slightly lower than board size, two
variables that are known to be associated with PWOB
(Heidrick and Struggles 1977; Harrigan 1981; Andre 1995;
Coffey and Wang 1998; Bertrand and Hallock 2001, Cat-
alyst 2001; Carter et al. 2003; Erhardt et al. 2003; Hillman
and Cannella 2007). Although not as high, the coefficient
of power distance is larger than that of firm size. In sum, in
terms of magnitude, we conclude that these cultural
dimensions do have a tangible impact on PWOB.
Finally, the variable uncertainty avoidance is intro-
duced in models 5 and 6. We do not find support for
hypothesis 4, according to which the proportion of women
on boards would be lower in countries that tend to avoid
uncertainties. As the power and masculinity dimensions
tested in H1 and H3 happen to correspond to widely held
stereotypes about gender differences, the stronger impact
of these cultural dimensions than for the individualism–
collectivism (H2) and uncertainty avoidance (H4) ones
are not overly surprising.
Robustness Analysis
To test the robustness of our results, we run a series of
additional analyses. These include different measure-
ments to define the cultural dimensions and the dependent
variable and a reduced sample covering the European
Union. The results, which are not all tabulated here for the
sake of conciseness, are similar to those discussed in
‘‘Multivariate Analysis’’ with masculinity and power
distance being the only two cultural dimensions associ-
ated with PWOB.
Hofstede’ scores have been proven to be quite stable
over decades, but the data were collected over 30 years
ago. Hofstede (2001) highlights that the forces that cause
cultures to shift tend to be global or continent-wide. This
means that they affect many countries at the same time, so
that if their cultures shift, they shift together, and their
relative positions remain the same. We first test the
robustness of this proxy by using the cultural dimensions
developed in the study conducted by GLOBE (House et al.
2004). The GLOBE research program conducted a study
whose main goal was to describe, understand, and predict
the influence of cultural variables on leadership, manage-
ment processes, and effectiveness around the world. This
program began in 1993 and used data from 825 organiza-
tions from 62 countries. Nine dimensions were identified,
namely: performance orientation, future orientation, gender
egalitarianism, assertiveness, institutional collectivism, in-
group collectivism, power distance, humane orientation,
and uncertainty avoidance. Table 8 in Appendix shows the
definition of these dimensions and the scores for the
countries included in our sample.
The results obtained with this proxy (see Table 6) con-
firm the ones obtained using the Hofstede measure, namely
that power distance and gender egalitarianism, a dimen-
sion similar to Hofstede’s masculinity, are associated with
PWOB.3
Second, as the ratio of women on board, PWOB, fluc-
tuates to a great extent among countries and may be
affected by increasing either the number of women or the
size of the board (denominator), we replace PWOB by a
more conservative dichotomous variable taking the value
of 1 when the board includes at least one woman and 0
otherwise. Results are similar to the ones obtained with the
continuous variable.
Table 6 OLS analysis of the
factors presumed to affect the
proportion of women on
corporate boards using
GLOBE’s cultural dimensions



































3 We used the same sample except for Belgium and Luxemburg
which were removed because the GLOBE study did not cover these
countries.
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Third, we rerun the model 6, but only for companies
with at least one woman on the board. One would assume
that there would be more gender equality sensitivity within
these companies. Results for this reduced sample are
similar to the original results.
Fourth, we rerun model 6 while only considering coun-
tries that are members of the European Union (EU). This
analysis allows us to examine the effect of culture on PWOB
within the EU where the debate about female representation
on boards is particularly intense as evidenced by the regu-
lation being put in place by several of EU countries. Further,
most of the cultures in the EU abide by the same legal and
institutional guidelines. Again, the results obtained for EU
country corporate boards reveal that power distance and
masculinity explain the variations in women’s access to
corporate boards. Finally, we rerun the model while only
keeping the following Anglo-Saxon countries (Australia,
Canada, Ireland, New Zealand, United Kingdom, United
States), which we deemed to belong to similar cultures. As
expected, the results reaffirm that the power distance and
masculinity cultural dimensions are associated with PWOB.
Conclusions
According to several sources, women are underrepresented
in corporate boards worldwide. This represents an impor-
tant ethical issue which many countries, especially in
Europe, are trying to resolve by a variety of means,
including legal quotas. Past research is not conclusive and
does not thoroughly account for the determinants of the
persistent bias in favor of the appointment of more men
than women directors. Furthermore, it stands out from the
past professional and academic literature as well as from
our own analysis that the proportion of women on boards is
far from being similar across countries. This leads us to
investigate if there is a cultural effect given institutional
isomorphism (DiMaggio and Powell 1983). The institu-
tional environment of a country which includes its national
culture determines the set of beliefs and values that, to
greater or lesser degree, are shared by its citizens. These
shared beliefs can specifically influence many social pro-
cesses and engender the creation of stereotypes and roles
associated with gender. In turn, these stereotypes might
condition the professional progress of women.
As evidenced by numerous studies, there are important
differences between the culture of different countries
(Hofstede 1980; Schwartz 1992; Ingleharts 1977, 2001;
Trompenaars 1993; House et al. 2004), and as supports
institutional theory, these cultural differences are the basis
for the differences in the structures of corporate gover-
nance at the international level (Aguilera and Jackson
2003; Lubatkin et al. 2007).
To explore this issue, our study compares the level of
representation of women on corporate boards across 32
countries. Our analysis looks specifically into whether the
prevailing culture of a country influences the ability of
women to access boards’ directorships.
To provide a specific and relatively objective evaluation
of the culture of a country, we use the cultural dimensions
proposed in the seminal work of Hofstede (1980), as those
measures are still considered the best proxy for culture
despite some critics. Our results indeed reveal that certain
aspects of the culture of a country contribute to determine the
level of representation of women on corporate boards of
directors. Specifically, two of the four cultural dimensions
suggested by Hofstede (1980) (or two of the three dimen-
sions for which we propose directional hypotheses) stand
out. The first refers to ‘‘power distance’’ according to which
firms operating in countries where an unequal distribution of
power in institutions and organizations is accepted, tend to
have a lesser proportion of women represented on their
corporate boards. The second cultural dimension termed
‘‘masculinity’’ indicates that when societal values associated
with the masculine role prevail, the proportion of women on
corporate boards is generally lower.
This study is subject to some caveats. Despite the exten-
sive and conclusive use of Hofstede’s cultural model in
previous studies, it has been the subject of several critiques.
First, the definitions of cultural dimension are extracted from
only one company. Second, the culture of a country is a
complex concept that may be very difficult to capture
quantitatively in four dimensions. To alleviate those limits,
we use other measures as robustness checks with similar
results. Third, we have assumed that the effect of the cultural
dimensions on female representation on corporate boards are
independent of each other, but theymay interact in a complex
way that was not investigated in this study. Finally, although
the p values are high, ourmodels show lowR squared. Future
research should consider using more comprehensive models
to increase the explanatory power. For instance, we assumed
that the level of education and experience is the same for
male and female directors in our sample.
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Table 7 Scores of cultural dimensions by country Hofstede (2000)
Country Power distance Individualism Masculinity Uncertainty avoidance
Australia 36 90 61 51
Austria 11 55 79 70
Belgium 65 75 54 94
Brazil 69 38 49 76
Canada 39 80 52 48
China 80 20 66 30
Denmark 18 74 16 23
Finland 33 63 26 59
France 68 71 43 86
Germany 35 67 66 65
Greece 60 35 57 112
Holland 38 80 14 53
Hong Kong 68 25 57 29
India 77 48 56 40
Ireland 28 70 68 35
Israel 13 54 47 81
Italy 50 76 70 75
Japan 54 46 95 92
Luxembourg 39.1 60.9 45.8 68
Malaysia 104 26 50 36
Mexico 81 30 69 82
New Zealand 22 79 58 49
Poland 68 60 64 93
Portugal 63 27 31 104
Russia 93 39 36 95
Singapore 74 20 48 8
South Africa 49 65 83 49
Spain 57 51 42 86
Sweden 31 71 5 29
Switzerland 34 68 70 58
United Kingdom 35 89 66 35
United States 40 91 62 46
Power distance the degree to which a society accepts an unequal distribution of power in its institutions and organizations
Individualism the degree to which individuals prefer to behave according to individual values rather than to those of the group to which they
belong
Masculinity refers to the distribution of emotional roles between the genders
Uncertainty avoidance indicates to what extent a culture programs its members to feel either uncomfortable or comfortable in unstructured
situations
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